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Comments
The California Article 9 No-Deficiency Rule:
Undermining the Secured Party's Security
The underlying purpose of article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code ("UCC") is to provide a single device for regulating security in-
terests in personal property,' including the rights of secured parties2
and debtors3 in cases of default by the debtor.4 The UCC specifically
provides that a secured party must give personal notice to the default-
ing debtor of the proposed sale of the debtor's collateral and must dis-
pose of the collateral in a commercially reasonable manner.5 When the
proceeds from the sale of the collateral do not satisfy the debt, the se-
cured party is entitled to a deficiency judgment,6 that is, a personal
judgment against the debtor for the amount of the debt less the amount
realized on the sale of the collateral.7 Jurisdictions that have adopted
the UCC disagree markedly, however, over the secured party's right to
a deficiency judgment when he or she has failed to give notice or to
conduct a commercially reasonable sale. Although the California
Supreme Court has not addressed this issue, several of the state's appel-
late courts have held that compliance with the notice and sale provi-
sions is a condition precedent to recovery of a deficiency judgment.8
I. U.C.C. § 9-101 official comment (1978).
2. Secured party, defined at U.C.C. § 9-105(m), means "a lender, seller or other per-
son in whose favor there is a security interest, including a person to whom accounts or
chattel paper have been sold."
3. "'Debtor' means the person who owes payment or other performance of the obliga-
tion secured, whether or not he owns or has rights in the collateral, and includes the seller of
accounts or chattel papers." U.C.C. § 9-105(d) (1978).
4. Id. §§ 9-501 to 9-507.
5. Id. § 9-504(3). For the text of this section, see infra note 16.
6. U.C.C. § 9-504(2) provides that, "[i]f the security interest secures an indebtedness,
the secured party must account to the debtor for any surplus [resulting from sale of the
collateral], and, unless otherwise agreed, the debtor is liable for any deficiency." Where the
underlying transaction is a sale of accounts or chattel paper, however, the debtor is only
liable for a deficiency or entitled to a surplus if the security agreement so provides. Id.
7. "'Collateral' means the property subject to a security interest, and includes ac-
counts and chattel paper which have been sold." Id. § 9-105(l)(c) (1978).
8. Western Decor & Furnishing Indus. v. Bank of America, 91 Cal. App. 3d 293, 308,
154 Cal. Rptr. 287, 294-95 (1979); General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Bo-Mar Constr. Co., 72 Cal.
App. 3d 887, 891, 140 Cal. Rptr. 417, 419 (1977); J.T. Jenkins Co. v. Kennedy, 45 Cal. App.
3d 474, 481-82, 119 Cal. Rptr. 578, 583 (1975); Barber v. LeRoy, 40 Cal. App. 3d 336, 342,
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This Comment first briefly reviews the alternative positions taken
by courts in states other than California regarding the availability of a
deficiency judgment to the secured party who does not comply with the
personal notice and sale provisions of UCC section 9-504(3). It then
critically examinesAtlas Thrift Co. v. Horan,9 the first California appel-
late case incorporating the no-deficiency rule into that state's interpre-
tation of the UCC. The Comment concludes that barring the
noncomplying secured party from obtaining a deficiency judgment is a
punitive remedy contrary to the UCC's policy of providing only com-
pensatory damages.' 0 Finally, the no-deficiency rule is found to im-
pose on the cost of credit financing a burden that furthers no useful
commercial policy.
The Code and the Courts
Default in the Article 9 Secured Transaction
Part 5 of article 9 of the UCC defines the rights and duties of a
debtor and a secured party upon the debtor's default.I' The UCC pro-
vides the secured party with several avenues of recourse against the
defaulting debtor, including self-help repossession and sale of the col-
lateral securing the debt. 12 If the proceeds from the sale are not enough
to reimburse the secured party, the debtor remains liable for the defi-
ciency, unless the parties have agreed otherwise. 13
Section 9-504(3) requires that the secured party give the debtor' 4
115 Cal. Rptr. 272,276 (1974); Atlas Thrift Co. v. Horan, 27 Cal. App. 3d 999, 1009, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 315, 321 (1972).
9. 27 Cal. App. 3d 999, 104 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1972).
10. U.C.C. § 1-106(1) (1978).
11. Article 9 does not define default, but allows the parties to determine by agreement
the conditions of default. The parties' ability to agree to default terms is limited only by the
good faith requirement of U.C.C. § 1-203. "Since payment on time is of the essence of the
debtor's obligation, his failure to do so leaves him in default whether the security agreement
spells the matter out or not. Beyond that point default is, within reason, a matter of contract
and can best be defined as being whatever the security agreement says it is." 2 G. GILMORE,
SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 43.3 (1965). See generally J. WHITE & R.
SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1085-90 (2d
ed. 1980) (discussion of what may constitute default in a secured transaction).
12. U.C.C. § 9-501(1) provides that the secured party can reduce the claim to judg-
ment, foreclose, or otherwise enforce his or her interest through judicial procedures; alterna-
tively, the secured party may repossess the collateral, with or without the aid of judicial
process, if such a "self help" repossession can be effected without breach of the peace. id.
§ 9-503. After repossession, the creditor either can resell the collateral at a public or private
sale, subject to certain restrictions, id. § 9-504(3), or can retain possession of it in satisfaction
of the debt, in a procedure known as strict foreclosure. Id. § 9-505(2). For an overview of
the secured party's remedies under article 9 of the UCC, see J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra
note 11, at 1090-1110.
13. U.C.C. § 9-504(2) (1978). For the text of this section, see supra note 6.
14. The secured party must also give written notice to any other secured party who has
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reasonable, personal notice15 of the time and place of any public sale or
given the secured party notice of a claim of an interest in the collateral before notice has
been given to the debtor or before the debtor has renounced his or her right to notice.
U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (1978). For the complete text of this provision, see infra note 16.
15. The drafters of the UCC intended the notice provision to be flexible and so did not
include any statutory time periods or exact methods of giving notice. Official comment 5 to
§ 9-504 only states that "at a minimum. . .[notice] must be sent in such time that persons
entitled to receive it will have sufficient time to take appropriate steps to protect their inter-
ests by taking part in the sale or other disposition if they so desire." It was the drafters'
judgment that a provision adaptable to the peculiar circumstances of each secured transac-
tion would promote sales under conditions likely to produce fair resale prices. PERMANENT
EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, REPORT No. 2, at 294-95
(1962). For example, where the collateral is perishable "or threatens to decline speedily in
value or is of a type customarily sold on a recognized market," U.C.C. § 9-504(3), no notice
need be sent because in the first case delay will result in loss of resale value, and in the
second, a sale on a recognized market, such as the New York Stock Exchange, presump-
tively results in realization of the fair market value of the collateral. See Wilmington Trust
Co. v. Conner, 415 A.2d 773, 776 (Del. 1980); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 11, at
I 111. See generally Dorset, Disposition of CollateralAfter Default Under the Unform Com-
mercial Code, 84 BANKING L.J. 659, 661-63 (1967); Hogan, Pitfalls in Default Procedure, 2
U.C.C. L.J. 244, 252-55 (1970); Hudak & Turbull, The Standard of Commercial Reasonable-
ness in the Sale of Repossessed Collateral Under the U.C.C., 4 WESTERN ST. U.L. REv. 22,
24-25 (1976); Note, Denial of Dficiency: A Problem of Reasonable Notice Under U. C. C. § 9-
504(3), 34 OHIO ST. L.J. 657, 666 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Denial of Deciency].
The California legislature amended the reasonable notification of resale provisions of
§ 9-504(3) in response to criticism that such a vague standard as "reasonable" notice would
promote litigation. A definite standard, the legislature thought, would avoid controversy
over what constitutes reasonable notice. CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE, SENATE FACT FIND-
ING COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, SIXTH PROGRESS REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE, PART 1,
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 402, 587 (1959-1961). See generally Atlas Thrift Co. v.
Horan, 27 Cal. App. 3d 999, 1004, 104 Cal. Rptr. 315, 318 (1972).
While specific notice requirements might on first impression seem preferable to the
more amorphous provision for reasonable notice, the Permanent Editorial Board of the
UCC criticized the California amendment. The Board noted that "[o]ne major objective [of
the personal notice and commercial reasonableness provisions] was to preserve maximum
flexibility for this extremely wide range of collateral .... Thus, the general standards of
good faith and commercial reasonableness were adopted in preference to rigid mandatory
formulae.... [The Editorial Board] believes that the elaborate rules relating to notice in
the California amendment tend to destroy desirable flexibility... and by providing for
stereotyped forms of notice in public sales, could well decrease realization on collateral to
the detriment of all parties." PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE, REPORT No. 2, at 294 (Official Text 1962), refprintedin CAL. COM. CODE § 9-504
(West Supp. 1981).
Despite this criticism, the California courts and legislature have preferred more rigid,
automatic responses to problems arising in secured transaction defaults than the UCC draft-
ers intended. U.C.C. § 9-504(3) as adopted in California adds the following requirements.
Where notice is required, "[s]uch notice must be delivered personally or be deposited in the
United States mail postage prepaid addressed to the debtor at his address as set forth in the
financing statement or as set forth in the security agreement or at such other address as may
have been furnished to the secured party in writing for this purpose, or, if no address has
been so set forth or furnished, at his last known address, and to any other secured party at
the address set forth in his request for notice, at least five days before the date fixed for any
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of the time after which a private sale or other disposition will be
made.' 6 This section also requires the secured party to dispose of the
collateral in a "commercially reasonable" manner. 17 While the UCC
does not define commercial reasonableness in absolute terms, one com-
mentator has suggested that the test is whether the sale conforms to the
usual practices "among dealers in similar property, or [whether] the
property is sold in the usual manner in a recognized market or
[whether] the collateral is sold at a price current in a recognized market
at the time of sale."18 The determination of what constitutes reason-
public sale or before the day on or after which any private sale or other disposition is to be
made. Notice of the time and place of a public sale shall also be given at least five days
before the date of sale by publication once in a newspaper of general circulation published
in the county in which the sale is to be held." Additionally, the California version of U.C.C.
§ 9-504(3) sets forth various requirements for where public resale of the collateral may be
held: "Any public sale shall be held in the county or place specified in the security agree-
ment, or if no county or place is specified in the security agreement, in the county in which
the collateral or any part thereof is located or in the county in which the debtor has his
residence or chief place of business, or in the county in which the secured party has his
residence or a place of business if the debtor does not have a residence or chief place of
business within this state. If the collateral is located outside of this state or has been re-
moved from this state, a public sale may be held in the locality in which the collateral is
located. Any public sale may be postponed from time to time by public announcement at
the time and place last scheduled for the sale. . . .Any sale in which notice is delivered or
mailed and published as herein provided and which is held as herein provided is a public
sale."
16. U.C.C. § 9-504(3) provides: "Disposition of the collateral may be by public or pri-
vate proceedings and may be made by way of one or more contracts. Sale or other disposi-
tion may be as a unit or in parcels and at any time and place and on any terms but every
aspect of the disposition including the method, manner, time, place and terms must be com-
mercially reasonable. Unless collateral is perishable or threatens to decline speedily in value
or is of a type customarily sold on a recognized market, reasonable notification of the time
and place of any public sale or reasonable notification of the time after which any private
sale or other intended disposition is to be made shall be sent by the secured party to the
debtor, if he has not signed after default a statement renouncing or modifying his right to
notification of sale. In the case of consumer goods no other notification need be sent. In
other cases notification shall be sent to any other secured party from whom the secured party
has received (before sending his notification to the debtor or before the debtor's renunciation
of his rights) written notice of a claim of an interest in the collateral. The secured party may
buy at any public sale and if the collateral is of a type customarily sold in a recognized
market or is of a type which is the subject of widely distributed standard price quotations he
may buy at private sale."
17. Id.
18. R. HENSON, HANDBOOK ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE 381 (2d ed. 1979); see U.C.C. § 9-507(2) & official comment 2 (1978). While
the notice requirement protects the debtor's and other secured parties' interests in the collat-
eral before disposition, the requirement of commercial reasonableness is an attempt to en-
sure that the sale is properly carried out. Denial of Defciency, supra note 15, at 666. U.C.C.
§ 9-507(2) does not state that a disposition is commercially unreasonable simply because a
better price could have been obtained at a sale at a different time or in a different manner.
"Commercial reasonableness" is nonetheless related to sale price. The importance of the
requirement "lies in the fact that the amount of the deficiency judgment will be inversely
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able notice and commercially reasonable disposition has resulted in
some judicial disagreement. 19 The most pronounced division in this
area, however, concerns the liability inpurred by the secured party who
has not complied with the notice and commercially reasonable disposi-
tion requirements.
The division among the jurisdictions stems from varied interpreta-
tions of the scope of section 9-507(1), which sets out the secured party's
liabilities and debtor's remedies for the secured party's failure to com-
ply with part 5 of article 9. This section allows the debtor to petition
the court for orders restraining noncomplying sales and gives the
debtor2o the right after a sale to actual damages resulting from non-
compliance, or, where the collateral is consumer goods, to an automatic
recovery whether or not the debtor suffers any damage.21 Not al
courts, however, have agreed that section 9-507 is the debtor's sole
proportional to the sales price; if the price is high, the amount of the judgment will be low,
and vice versa. The 'method, manner, time, place and terms' tests are only proxies for 'in-
sufficient price,' and their importance lies exclusively in their use in guarding against an
unfairly low price." White, Representing the Low Income Consumer in Repossessions, Resales
and D eiency Judgment Cases, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 808, 818 (1970) (footnote omitted). See
also infra note 19.
19. For examples of cases discussing the commercial reasonableness requirement, see
In re Zsa Zsa Ltd., 352 F. Supp. 665 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aj'd without opinion, 475 F.2d 1393
(2d Cir. 1973) (UCC drafters deferred to case law for development of meaning of commer-
cial reasonableness); Credit Bureau Metro, Inc. v. Mims, 45 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 12, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 622 (1975) (failure of creditor to use "best efforts" to obtain highest possible sale price
resulted in commercially unreasonable sale); Schatten v. C.I.T. Corp., 335 So. 2d 572 (Fla.
App. 1978) (evidence that secured party used earnest efforts to secure fair sale price estab-
lished that sale was commercially reasonable); Wilkerson Motor Co. v. Johnson, 580 P.2d
505 (Okla. 1978) (the reasonableness of commercial conduct is to be measured by standards
of good faith and fair dealing). See also Hudak & Turnbull, supra note 15, at 25-33; White,
supra note 18, at 817-18; Note, Uniform Commercial Code: Aspects of a Commercially Rea-
sonable Sale of Repossessed Property, 19 WASHBURN L.J. 123 (1979).
For examples of cases discussing the reasonable notice requirement, see Leasing Assoc.
v. Slaughter & Son, Inc., 450 F.2d 174 (8th Cir. 1971) (mailing notice through regular mail is
sufficient); Edmonson v. Air Service Co., 123 Ga. App. 263, 180 S.E.2d 589 (1971) (notice is
not "sent" within meaning of UCC unless it was properly addressed, stamped, and mailed);
Citizens State Bank v. Sparks, 202 Neb. 661, 276 N.W.2d 661 (1979) (notice insufficient
which did not identify type of sale or time after which private sale would be made); see also
J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 1110-14; Siegal, Commercial Reasonableness in
Sales of Collateral, 49 L.A. BAR. BULL. 9 (1973).
20. Any person who is entitled to notice of the sale or who has notified the secured
party of his or her security interest in the collateral before it has been disposed of may also
bring an action for damages. For text of § 9-507(l) see infra note 21.
21. U.C.C. § 9-507(l) provides: "If it is established that the secured party is not pro-
ceeding in accordance with the provisions of this Part disposition may be ordered or re-
strained on appropriate terms and conditions. If the disposition has occurred the debtor or
any person entitled to notification or whose security interest has been made known to the
secured party prior to the disposition has a right to recover from the secured party any loss
caused by a failure to comply with the provisions of this Part. If the collateral is consumer
goods, the debtor has a right to recover in any event an amount not less than the credit
protection.22
Those courts considering the question of remedies available to the
debtor when the secured party has not complied with either the per-
sonal notice or commercial reasonableness requirements have taken
three positions. Some jurisdictions treat noncompliance as a complete
bar to a deficiency.23 Other jurisdictions reject the rule automatically
denying a deficiency judgment and limit the debtor to the section 9-507
remedies. 24 A third group of courts create a rebuttable presumption
that the value of the collateral sold equalled the amount of the debt.
The secured party must then produce evidence rebutting this presump-
tion in order to get a deficiency judgment.25
The Article 9 No-Deficiency Rule
Many courts, including those in California, view noncompliance
with the personal notice and commercial reasonableness requirements
as a complete bar to a deficiency. 26 One rationale for this position is
that, without notice, the debtor has lost his or her right to redeem the
collateral, 27 to bid at the sale, or to encourage potential buyers.28 If the
service charge plus ten per cent of the principal amount of the debt or the time price differ-
ential plus ten per cent of the cash price."
22. See infra notes 26-34 & accompanying text.
23. See id.
24. See infra notes 35-40 & accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 41-42 & accompanying text.
26. Skeels v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 222 F. Supp. 696 (W.D. Pa. 1963), rev'd on
other grounds, 335 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1964); Atlas Thrift Co. v. Horan, 27 Cal. App. 3d 999,
104 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1972); Wilmington Trust Co. v. Conner, 415 A.2d 773 (Del. 1980); Ran-
dolph v. Franklin Inv. Co., 398 A.2d 340 (D.C. Ct. App. 1979); Turk v. St. Petersburg Bank
& Trust Co., 281 So. 2d 534 (Fla. App. 1973); Braswell v. American Nat'l Bank, 117 Ga.
App. 699, 161 S.E.2d 420 (1968); Lloyds' Plan, Inc. v. Brown, 268 N.W.2d 192 (Iowa 1978);
Camden Nat'l Bank v. St. Clair, 309 A.2d 329 (Me. 1973); Abbot Motors, Inc. v. Ralston, 28
Mass. App. Dec. 35 (1964); Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Atlas Shirt Co., 66 Misc.
2d 1089, 323 N.Y.S.2d 13 (1971); Liberty Nat'l Bank v. Greiner, 62 Ohio App. 2d 125, 405
N.E.2d 317 (1978); FMA Fin. Corp. v. Pro-Printers, 590 P.2d 803 (Utah 1979); Aimonetto v.
Keepes, 501 P.2d 1017 (Wyo. 1972). The Nebraska State Supreme Court has held that
failure to give notice bars a deficiency, Bank of Gering v. Glover, 192 Neb. 575, 223 N.W.2d
56 (1974), but that a commercially unreasonable sale only results in the fair market value of
the collateral being offset against the balance due on the security agreement, Cornett v.
White Motor Corp., 190 Neb. 496, 209 N.W.2d 341 (1973). For a general discussion and
review of cases on the effect of noncompliance with § 9-504(3), see IA P. COOGAN, W. Ho-
GAN & D. VAGTS, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 8.06[21 (MB 1982).
27. U.C.C. § 9-506 provides that at any time before the secured party has disposed of
the collateral, the debtor may redeem it by tendering the amount of the debt as well as the
expenses reasonably incurred by the secured party in repossessing, holding, and preparing
the collateral for sale. See generally HENSON,.supra note 18, at 379-80.
28. See, e.g., Skeels v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 222 F. Supp. 696, 702 (W.D. Pa.
1963), rev'd on other grounds, 335 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1964); Bank of Gering v. Glover, 192
Neb. 575, 578, 222 N.W.2d 56, 58 (1974); Commercial Credit Corp. v. Woilgast, 11 Wash.
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debtor has the opportunity to redeem the collateral, to bid at the sale,29
or to produce buyers, a higher purchase price may be obtained, result-
ing in little or no deficiency. Where the secured party has not given
reasonable notice, thus possibly precluding a debtor's right to redeem,
the secured party should not be allowed to recover a benefit from his or
her wrong by recovering a deficiency judgment.30
Similar reasoning has been used to support the no-deficiency rule
where a commercially unreasonable sale is alleged to have occurred. A
commercially reasonable sale, one commentator has observed, will re-
sult in a more adequate sale price and a smaller deficiency, if a defi-
ciency remains at all.31 The secured party, therefore, should not
recover a deficiency judgment where the deficiency may have been
caused by the manner of the disposition.32
Courts adopting the no-deficiency rule have also based their deci-
sions on a second rationale. In many jurisdictions, the pre-UCC law
barred secured parties who failed to give notice of the sale of repos-
sessed collateral from obtaining deficiency judgments.33 Because the
UCC is silent as to its effect on pre-UCC law governing the debtor's
remedies against a misbehaving secured party, these courts have con-
App. 117, 521 P.2d 1151 (1974). See generally IA P. COOGAN, W. HOGAN & D. VAGTS,
supra note 26, § 8.06[2]; 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 11, § 44.94 (discussion of effect of failure
to comply with the statutory requirements on secured party's right to a deficiency judgment).
29. In reality it seems unlikely that the debtor who has defaulted on the loan will be in
a position to redeem the collateral, which requires that he or she tender an amount sufficient
to fulfill the debt secured by the collateral and any expenses the secured party has incurred,
U.C.C. § 9-506, or to bid at a public sale. Minetz, May a "Wrongdoer" Recover a Defciency
Judgment, or Is Section 9-507(7) a Debtor's Exclusive Remedy?, 6 U.C.C. L.J. 344, 362
(1974). See generally Davenport, Default, Enforcement and Remedies Under the RevisedArti-
cle 9 ofthe Uniform Commercial Code, 7 VAL. U.L. REV. 265, 298 (1973) (discussing ration-
ales for the 'no-deficiency rule).
30. See Minetz, supra note 29, at 348.
31. See White, supra note 18, at 817-18.
32. Id.
33. In jurisdictions that adopted the Uniform Conditional Sales Act ("UCSA"), a pre-
cursor to the UCC, compliance with the notice of resale provision of the UCSA was held by
many courts to be a condition precedent to recovery of a deficiency judgment. See, e.g.,
Frantz Equip. Co. v. Anderson, 37 N.J. 420, 431, 181 A.2d 499, 505, (1962). Compare
Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Atlas Shirt Co., 66 Misc. 2d 1089, 1090-91, 323
N.Y.S.2d 13, 16, (1971) (UCC did not specifically overrule the interpretation of the UCSA
that barred deficiencies to noncomplying creditors so same result should follow from the
UCC), with Conti Causeway Ford v. Jarossy, 114 N.J. Super., 382, 385, 276 A.2d 402, 404
(1971) (the UCC sale provisions are essentially different from those in the UCSA, so a differ-
ent result should follow). See generally 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 11, § 44.94.
The court in Atlas Thrift Co. v. Horan, 27 Cal. App. 3d 999, 104 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1972),
incorporated the pre-UCC common law of California into its interpretation of article 9 and
concluded that compliance with the notice and sale provisions is an absolute prerequisite to
recovery of a deficiency judgment. See, e.g., Camden Nat'l Bank v. St. Clair, 309 A.2d 329,
332 (Me. 1973).
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cluded that the same result should be reached in jurisdictions that have
adopted the UCC. 34
Section 9-507(1) as the Debtor's Exclusive Remedy
A second group of courts rejects this automatic denial of a defi-
ciency judgment to the noncomplying secured party. Instead, the
debtor's remedies are limited to those provided in section 9-507(1): an
affirmative suit against the secured party for damages, or setoff or
counterclaim in the secured party's suit for a deficiency judgment.35 As
opposed to those jurisdictions adopting the no-deficiency rule, these
courts prefer the UCC's explicit remedy provision over judicial legisla-
tion of additional debtor defenses. 36 The section 9-507(1)37 remedies
allow the court to "reach the merits of each case" 38 and, therefore, to
measure damages by the harm caused by the noncompliance. Punitive
remedies are avoided, 39 and the debtor is recompensed only for such
damage as he or she has actually suffered. 40
Creation of a Rebuttable Presumption Favoring the Debtor
Finally, a third group of courts takes the position that the secured
party who breaches the personal notice or commercial reasonableness
provisions is not absolutely barred from a deficiency judgment. The
secured party, however, must rebut a presumption that the collateral
was worth the amount of the debt by evidence other than the price
received at the resale.41 The secured party bears the burden of proving
34. See, e.g., Atlas Thrift Co. v. Horan, 27 Cal. App. 3d 999, 104 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1972);
Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Atlas Shirt Co., 66 Misc. 2d 1089, 323 N.Y.S.2d 13
(1971).
35. Barbour v. United States, 562 F.2d 19 (10th Cir. 1977); Valley Mining Corp. v.
Metro Bank, 383 So. 2d 158 (Ala. 1980); Chapman v. Field, 124 Ariz. 100, 602 P.2d 481
(1979); Hall v. Owen County State Bank, 175 Ind. App. 150, 370 N.E.2d 918 (1977); Walker
v. V.M. Box Motor Co., 325 So. 2d 905 (Miss. 1976); Conti Causeway Ford v. Jarossy, 114
N.J. Super. 382, 276 A.2d 402 (1971); Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Young, 612 P.2d 1357 (Okla.
1980); Grant County Tractor Co. v. Nuss, 6 Wash. App. 866, 496 P.2d 966 (1972).
36. See, e.g., Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Young, 612 P.2d at 1359; Hall v. Owen County State
Bank, 172 Ind. App. at 160-61, 370 N.E.2d at 927; P. COOGAN, W. HOGAN & D. VAGTS,
supra note 26, § 8.06[2].
37. For text of § 9-507(1), see supra note 21.
38. Hall v. Owen County State Bank, 175 Ind. App. at 160, 370 N.E.2d at 927.
39. See First Ala. Bank of Montgomery v. Parsons, 390 So. 2d 640, 643 (Ala. App.
1980); Hall v. Owen County State Bank, 175 Ind. App. at 160, 370 N.E.2d at 927; Cornett v.
White Motor Corp., 190 Neb. 496, 501, 209 N.W.2d 341, 344 (1973); Beneficial Fin. Co. v.
Young, 612 P.2d at 1359. See infra text accompanying notes 128-31.
40. Grant County Tractor v. Nuss, 6 Wash. App. 866, 496 P.2d 966 (1972).
41. United States v. Willis, 593 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1979); United States v. Conrad Pub-
lishing Co., 589 F.2d 949 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Whitehouse Plastics, 501 F.2d 692
(5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied sub nom. Baker v. United States, 421 U.S. 912 (1975); In re
Bishop, 482 F.2d 381 (4th Cir. 1973); Leasing Assoc. v. Slaughter & Son, Inc., 450 F.2d 174
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that a deficiency would have resulted from a sale complying with the
statutory provisions. If the secured party is successful, he or she is
awarded a deficiency judgment, offset by any damages the debtor may
be entitled to under section 9-507(1).42
The California No-Deficiency Rule
The California Supreme Court has not yet addressed the question
of which remedies are appropriate when a secured party violates the
personal notice or commercial reasonableness requirement. The 1972
appellate decision of Atlas Thrift Company v. Horan,43 however, held
that compliance with these provisions is an absolute prerequisite to re-
covery of a deficiency judgment, a ruling now accepted as authority on
this issue by lower California courts.44
The dispute in Atlas Thrift arose over a typical commercial credit
transaction. Defendant Horan's son-in-law needed a $10,000 loan to
buy equipment to open a delicatessen. On the strength of Horan's rep-
resentation that he was a silent partner in the venture, Atlas, a commer-
cial lender, agreed to make the loan.45 Shortly thereafter, the son-in-
law defaulted and filed for bankruptcy. Plaintiff repossessed the equip-
(8th Cir. 1971); Weaver v. O'Meara Motor Co., 248 Ark. 665, 453 S.W.2d 37 (1970); Com-
munity Management Assoc. of Colorado Springs v. Tousley, 505 P.2d 1314 (Colo. App.
1973); State Bank of Burleigh County Trust Co. v. All-American Sub, Inc., 289 N.W.2d 772
(N.D. 1980).
42. For an example of application of the rule, see infra note 56 & accompanying text.
43. 27 Cal. App. 3d 999, 104 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1972).
44. See Western Decor & Furnishings Indus. v. Bank of America, 91 Cal. App. 3d 293,
154 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1979); Clark Equip. Co. v. Mastelotto, Inc., 87 Cal. App. 3d 88, 150 Cal.
Rptr. 797 (1978); General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Bo-Mar Constr. Co., 72 Cal. App. 3d 887,
140 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1977); J.T. Jenkins Co. v. Kennedy, 45 Cal. App. 3d 474, 119 Cal. Rptr.
578 (1975); Barber v. LeRoy, 40 Cal. App. 3d 336, 115 Cal. Rptr. 272 (1974).
One decision expanded the no-deficiency rule of Alas Thrift to impose upon the se-
cured party the burden of pleading and proving compliance with the notice and commercial
reasonableness requirements in a suit for a deficiency judgment. Barber v. LeRoy, 40 Cal.
App. 3d at 343, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 277.
45. The president of Atlas was acquainted with Horan and with his credit rating.
Horan refused, however, to sign the financing agreement, claiming that his lease for his own
delicatessen business prohibited him from engaging in a similar enterprise within 25 miles of
his current location. After the son-in-law entered bankruptcy and Atlas turned to Horan to
make good on the loan, Horan denied that he was a silent partner in the business. The trial
court in its findings of fact, which were not challenged on appeal, found that Horan had
orally represented himself as a silent partner in the venture. On appeal the parties conceded
that Horan was a "debtor" within the meaning of California Commercial Code § 9105(l)(d)
(U.C.C. § 9-105(l)(d)) and was entitled to notice of the sale of the collateral. Atlas Thrift, 27
Cal. App. 3d at 1001-02, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 315-16.
California adopted the UCC as its Commercial Code and renumbered the sections to
conform to the numbering of the California Codes, dropping the hyphens found in the UCC
version. For example, U.C.C. § 9-504 appears as CAL. COM. CODE § 9504. The text of this
Comment adheres to the UCC numbering system for consistency.
ment and, without giving Horan the required personal notice, sold it at
a "public 'sale' in its own office." 46 Actually, Atlas itself purchased the
collateral for $2,000. The trial court later found the collateral to have
had a fair market value of $12,500 at the time of the sale.47
Atlas argued to the court that failure to give notice or to conduct a
commercially reasonable sale did not as a matter of law deprive the
secured party of the right to a deficiency judgment.48 The plaintiff fur-
ther asserted that, because the section 9-507(1) damages provision fur-
nished "an adequate and exclusive remedy," the debtor was '"vrecluded
by law from raising a failure to comply with section 9504, subdivision
(3), as a defense to a deficiency action. .... -49 The conclusion Atlas
urged upon the court was that section 9-507(1) gave the debtor an ex-
clusive remedy for damages caused by the secured party's failure to
comply with the notice and commercial reasonableness requirements. 50
Horan countered that the secured party's failure to comply with
section 9-504(3) gave the debtor a complete defense to a deficiency
judgment action as a matter of law.51 He based this conclusion on
cases holding that personal notice is mandatory and a "condition pre-
cedent to the secured party's recovery of a deficiency judgment. ' 52 No-
tice especially was considered essential because without it the debtor
was denied the right of redemption. 53 The key to Horan's argument
was his assertion that section 9-507 was "intended only to provide an
affirmative cause of action to recover for a loss that has already been
sustained." From this narrow reading of section 9-507, Horan con-
tended that the secured party's noncompliance provided the debtor a
complete defense to a deficiency judgment action. 54
The trial court agreed with Atlas' argument, taking the view that
"the spirit of commercial reasonableness requires that the secured party
not be arbitrarily deprived of his deficiency. . .. -55 Applying the rule
that the noncomplying secured party must rebut a presumption that the
market value of the collateral equalled the amount of the debt, and
finding that the collateral was worth $12,500, the trial court levied a
46. Atlas Thrift, 27 Cal. App. 3d at 1001, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 316.
47. Id. at 1002 n.1, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 316 n.1.
48. Id. at 1003, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 317.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1002, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 316.
52. Id. at 1007, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 320 (citations omitted).
53. Id.
54. Id. Horan was seeking, therefore, full relief from the debt, not damages to compen-
sate for any loss Atlas' conduct might have caused him.
55. Id. at 1006-07, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 319-20 (quoting Conti Causeway Ford v. Jarossy,
114 N.J. Super. 382, 386, 276 A.2d 402, 404 (1971)).
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$2,000 judgment against Horan.56 The appellate court, recognizing
that the availability of a deficiency judgment under these circumstances
was a question of first impression in California,57 reversed the trial
court and denied the deficiency judgment.
After reviewing the various positions taken on this issue in other
jurisdictions, the appellate court accepted Horan's argument on three
grounds. First, the court reasoned that section 9-507 was not an exclu-
sive remedy because the UCC did not expressly state that it was exclu-
sive. TheAtlas Thrift court relied on section 1-103 of the UCC, which
authorizes the incorporation of "pre-Code" remedies, 58 to justify its ap-
plication of the California common law to the case. Second, the court
concluded that section 9-507(l) is phrased as an "affirmative remedy"
for the debtor and thus cannot be used by the debtor as a defense to a
deficiency judgment.59 Finally, the court suggested, without explana-
tion, that public policy and "the ends of justice" support the no-defi-
ciency rule.60 When the reasoning underlying each of these
conclusions is examined, however, serious flaws appear.
Incorporation of Pre-UCC Remedies
The UCC provides for the incorporation of pre-UCC law only
where the UCC has not "displaced preexisting. . . principles of law
and equity."61 The Atlas ThrO court did not consider whether section
56. Id. The trial court made the following calculation in arriving at its finding of a
$2,000 deficiency owed by Horan:
Amount due on default $15,000
Less: Payments made ($500) plus fair market value of the collateral
($12,500) $13,000
Deficiency Owed $ 2,000
At trial, apparently neither Atlas nor Horan offered appraisal evidence as to the value
of the collateral. The trial court, therefore, looked to the Security Agreement and found the
value listed there to be $12,500. It appears that no evidence was offered of any diminution
in value of the equipment because of use in the defendant's business. Id. at 1006 n.5, 104
Cal. Rptr. at 319 n.5.
57. Id. at 1003, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 317. The court noted that it was faced with nothing
approaching the uniformity of "laws among the various jurisdictions" that the drafters of the
UCC hoped to foster. U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(c) (1978).
58. 27 Cal. App. 3d at 1007, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 320-21. See infra text accompanying
notes 61-85.
59. 27 Cal. App. 3d at 1008-09, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 321. See infra text accompanying
notes 94-101.
60. 27 Cal. App. 3d at 1008, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 321. See infra text accompanying notes
105-20.
61. U.C.C. § 1-103 provides: "Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act,
the principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to capacity
to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mis-
take, bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating cause shall supplement its provisions."
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9-507 had displaced California common law, but instead summarily
concluded that, because section 9-507 does not claim exclusivity in the
field of remedies and does not mention deficiency judgments, the sec-
tion allows a court to supplement its rule with common law princi-
ples.62 In determining whether recourse to pre-UCC law through
section 1-103 was available in a given circumstance, however, courts in
states other than California have considered whether the UCC "dis-
places" the former law, rather than whether language in the statute ex-
pressly states that a particular section occupies the field.63 The
Supreme Court of Alaska,6 for example, ruled that a trial court, using
section 1-103 to move from the UCC system to the common law, erred
in applying "general contract principles" to a sale of goods contract:
Where both the code and general principles are available, the former
should always be considered and applied if applicable. By legislative
declaration the code is the law, and if general principles appear in-
consistent, they must be considered displaced ....
Specific code provisions were available to deal with the present
case; they should have been applied.65
Had the court applied this reasoning to the remedies issue in Atlas
Thrtfl, it would have reached a different result in that case. Section 9-
504(2) of the UCC gives the secured party the right to a deficiency
judgment.66 Section 9-507 establishes the liability of the secured party
for breach of the debtor's rights to personal notice and to a reasonable
sale.67 By precluding the secured party's right to a deficiency judg-
62. The Atlas Thrft court's discussion of the appropriateness of using pre-UCC law
was brief: "Since section 9507 is not expressly made an exclusive remedy, and does not specifi-
callypurport to have any bearing on deficiency judgments, it is of significance to recall that
under California law a mortgagee who disposed of mortgaged property after default, with-
out following the notice requirements. . . was barred from recovering a deficiency judg-
ment." 27 Cal. App. 3d at 1008, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 321 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
The court does not explain why the failure of § 9-507 to claim exclusivity leads to the con-
clusion that it is not exclusive, nor why the failure of this damages provision to "deal with"
deficiency judgments implies that damages and the bar-to-deficiency rule are cumulative
remedies where the creditor has not complied with § 9-504(3). See also In re Bishop, 482
F.2d 381, 385 n.3 (4th Cir. 1973) (pre-UCC Virginia law held that the noncomplying credi-
tor was barred from receiving a deficiency judgment; therefore, the bankruptcy court was
not wrong as a matter of law to apply that rule to a case governed by the UCC); Camden
Nat'l Bank v. St. Clair, 309 A.2d 329 (Me. 1973) (using § 1-103 to adopt the pre-UCC law of
Maine barring deficiency judgments to noncomplying creditors as the rule under the UCC).
63. See generally Toomey Equip. Co. v. Commercial Credit Equip. Corp., 386 So.2d
1155, 1159 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980) (where particular "provisions [of the UCC] do displace
prior law, the code prevails"); Philadelphia Bond & Mortgage Co. v. Highland Crest Homes,
Inc., 235 Pa. Super. 252, 261, 340 A.2d 476, 481 (1975) (a common law doctrine can "only
stand to the extent that it is not inconsistent with the Code").
64. Prince v. LeVan, 486 P.2d 959 (Alaska 1971).
65. Id. at 962.
66. See supra note 6.
67. See supra note 21.
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ment, the common law is inconsistent with these UCC provisions. The
conclusion more consistent with case law interpreting section 1-103,
therefore, is that the section 9-507 remedies for breach of the secured
party's duties following default under part 5 displace the common law
on the subject.68
The Atlas Thrfit court, however, based its use of section 1-103 on
the absence of language expressly overruling the common law. In tak-
ing this approach, the court may have been relying on a general rule of
statutory interpretation: a statute is presumed to state the common law
absent express indications to the contrary;69 the common law is dis-
placed, however, where it has been modified by statute.70 The intent to
supplant the common law by statute may be found in the statute itself,
in its legislative history, or in the comments of the drafters or code
commissioners.7 1 While section 9-507(1) does not explicitly claim to
occupy the field of debtor remedies in secured transactions, the official
comment to that section and the comments introducing article 9 indi-
cate the intent that the statute occupy the field.72
The intended relationship of the UCC provision for damages to
the common law is evident from the underlying goal of the UCC: "to
make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions. ' 73 By reverting
to pre-UCC law, theAtlas Thrift court helped to frustrate this policy by
revitalizing a rule peculiar to California,74 making possible a result that
68. In considering the effect of a failure to give notice on a creditor's right to a defi-
ciency, "[a] few courts have held that in the absence of a specific provision of the Uniform
Commercial Code addressing this problem, they would allow the precedents established
under pre-Code statutes. . . .[Elvaluating the problem anew in the context of the new Act
is more desirable. . . .When the Code fails to answer a particular question directly, there is
no need to completely disregard prior law [citing § 1-103], but the primary source of learn-
ing should be the Code itself. A court's goal should be to interpret the Act in a way that will
further its underlying purposes and policies." Rushton v. Shea, 423 F. Supp. 468, 471 (D.
Del. 1976) (citations omitted).
69. See, e.g., Saala v. McFarland, 63 Cal. 2d 124, 130, 403 P.2d 400, 404, 45 Cal. Rptr.
144, 148 (1965); Gray v. Sutherland, 124 Cal. App. 2d 280, 290, 268 P.2d 754, 761 (1954).
70. See, e.g., Estate of Elizalde, 182 Cal. 427, 432-33, 188 P. 560, 562 (1920); Monterey
Club v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. App. 2d 131, 145, 119 P.2d 349, 356 (1941); CAL. Civ. CODE
§ 4 (West 1954) ("The rule of the common law, that statutes in derogation thereof are to be
strictly construed, has no application to this Code. The Code establishes the law of this State
respecting the subjects to which it relates, and its provisions are to be liberally construed
with the view to effect its objects and to promote justice.").
71. Liv. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 817 n.10, 532 P.2d 1226, 1235 n.10, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 858, 867 n.10 (1975); Baranov v. Scudder, 177 Cal. 458, 464-65, 170 P. 1122, 1124
(1918); O'Hara v. Wattson, 172 Cal. 525, 534-35, 157 P. 608, 610 (1916). See generally 58
CAL. JUR. 3D Statutes § 5 (1980) (discussing the effect of statutes on the common law in
California).
72. See infra notes 75-83 & accompanying text.
73. U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(c) (1978).
74. See infra text accompanying notes 84-93.
other jurisdictions, using the same reasoning, would not necessarily
reach.
The more specific relationship of article 9 to the common law is
suggested in the official comment to section 9-101, which explains that
the article establishes "a comprehensive scheme for the regulation" of
secured transactions.75 The comment proceeds with an overview of
pre-UCC security law and states that, in the face of complex and incon-
sistent common law governing secured financing devices, the article
aims "to provide a simple and unified structure within which . . .
secured financing transactions can go forward with less cost and greater
certainty." 76 From this statement, it appears that the drafters intended
article 9 to replace, not supplement, existing law.
The intended scope of the section 9-507 remedies provision can
also be discerned by reading the section as the UCC instructs: "Section
captions are parts of this Act [and] not mere surplusage." 77 Section 9-
507 is captioned "Secured Party's Liability for Failure to Comply With
This Part." Subsection 1 then lists the liabilities that the secured party
might incur if he or she fails to meet the notice or sale requirements. 7
The scope of these remedies, therefore, should be determined by read-
ing them together with the section caption. When so read, it is evident
that the section provides a comprehensive listing of the "Secured
Party's Liability" for noncompliance with part 5 of article 9, not merely
one of a number of remedies available to the debtor. 79
The effect of section 9-507 on the common law can best be dis-
cerned from the drafters' intent in formulating it. The section's pur-
pose is to enforce the limitations on the secured party's right to dispose
of the collateral by giving the debtor remedies for the secured party's
breach of duties of good faith, personal notice, and commercial reason-
ableness. 80 The drafters explain in the official comment to the section
75. U.C.C. § 9-101 official comment (1978).
76. Id. (emphasis added).
77. Id § 1-109 (1978). In keeping with its statutory scheme, which deems section cap-
tions to have no effect on the "scope, meaning or intent of the provisions of a section,"
California did not enact § 1-109. CAL. COM. CODE § 1109, California code comment (West
1964). This departure from the UCC version is irrelevant here, however, because the intent
of the UCC drafters, and not that of the California legislature, is at issue.
78. See supra note 21.
79. A similar conclusion was reached in United States v. Whitehouse Plastics, 501 F.2d
692, 696 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied sub nom. Baker v. United States, 421 U.S. 912 (1975):
"In view of this specific statutory remedy [§ 9-507(1)] we doubt that . . . failure to give
notice would bar the creditor's right to a deficiency judgment. . . . This conclusion is
strengthened by the discussion in Norton v. Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 240 Ark. 143, 398
S.W.2d 538, 539-40 (1966), which indicates that amicus briefs filed in that case for the Per-
manent Editorial Board of the UCC concluded that improper disposition by the secured
party made the secured party liable for damages suffered as a result." See IA P. COOGAN,
W. HOGAN & D. VAGTS, supra note 26, § 8.06[1].
80. U.C.C. § 9-507 official comment 1 (1978).
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that "[i]n the case where [the creditor] proceeds, or is about to proceed
in a contrary manner, it is vital both to the debtor and other creditors to
provide a remedy for failure to comply with the statutory duty. '81 The
comment then restates the remedies provided: judicial restraint of non-
complying sales and damages where the disposition has already oc-
curred.82 This statement implies that the section provides a
comprehensive plan for enforcing a policy of commercial reasonable-
ness in the sale of the debtor's collateral, in that specific remedies are
provided to the debtor in the event of the secured party's breach.83 The
absence of an explicit rejection of the common law notwithstanding,
the comments to article 9 and to section 9-507, as well as the UCC's
goal of providing a uniform law, persuasively suggest that these reme-
dies are exclusive. Judicial resort to pre-UCC law is, therefore,
impermissible.
Assuming, however, that section 9-507 is not exclusive and could
be supplemented by pre-UCC law, the court's determination in Atlas
Thrift of what constitutes appropriate pre-UCC law concerning the
availability of a deficiency judgment must be questioned. The court
analogized defaults in UCC secured transactions to defaults on chattel
mortgages under pre-UCC California law,84 and relied on Metheny v.
Davis,85 the authoritative case on deficiency judgments under that sys-
tem. The Metheny court ruled that a creditor who did not give notice
of the sale of the debtor's collateral forfeited the right to a deficiency
judgment.8 6
In Metheny, a promissory note was secured by a chattel mortgage
on household furniture. Upon default on the note, the mortgagee took
possession of the furniture and sold it without first giving notice to the
mortgagor as required by statute and by the terms of the mortgage
agreement.87 The court denied the mortgagee his deficiency judgment
because in California a chattel mortgage created only a lien on prop-
erty.88 The mortgagee's improper disposition of the collateral, there-
fore, amounted to a conversion destroying the lien and, consequently,
any further rights that the mortgagee might assert against the mortga-
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. A Washington state appellate court considering remedies for a secured party's fail-
ure to give notice of resale of the debtor's collateral concluded, "In view of this remedy [§ 9-
507(1) damages], we are of the opinion the writers of the Uniform Commercial Code did not
intend that the creditor's [noncompliance]. . .would result in a forfeiture of the creditor's
right to a deficiency." Grant County Tractor Co. v. Nuss, 6 Wash. App. 866, 870, 496 P.2d
966, 969 (1972); see also Hogan, Pflyalls in Default Procedure, 2 U.C.C. L.J. 244, 257 (1970).
84. 4tlas Thri, 27 Cal. App. 3d at 1008, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 321.
85. 107 Cal. App. 137, 290 P. 91 (1930).
86. Id. at 142, 290 P. at 92-93.
87. Id. at 138, 290 P. at 91.
88. Id. at 139, 290 P. at 91.
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gor.89 The Metheny court pointed out that this result would not follow
in jurisdictions where a chattel mortgage invested the mortgagee with
legal title instead of a lien; in such jurisdictions, "the only relief the
mortgagor is entitled to is to have credited upon his note the fair value
of the mortgaged property.
90
Metheny, however, is inapposite to the secured transaction reme-
dies problem in Atlas Thrft. Section 1-103 allows incorporation of pre-
UCC law only where it has not been displaced by the UCC.91 The
crucial distinction made in Metheny between title and lien theories of
security devices is one that the UCC explicitly rejects: "Each provision
of. . . Article [91 with regard to rights, obligations and remedies ap-
plies whether title to collateral is in the secured party or in the
debtor."92 Further, in an official comment the drafters reiterate that
"rights, obligations and remedies under the Article do not depend on
the location of title."' 93 The Metheny court adopted the no-deficiency
rule because California at that time followed a lien theory of chattel
mortgages. Because this theory is no longer valid under the UCC,
Metheny does not supply a valid precedent for the holding of Atlas
Thrift.
The court's reliance on pre-UCC law as one basis for adopting the
no-deficiency rule is misplaced. Resort to pre-UCC law is not, in this
situation, authorized by section 1-103, nor is the California chattel
mortgage no-deficiency rule sufficiently analogous to the UCC secured
transaction to be of precedential value. However, the Atlas Thrift court
based its holding on two additional grounds that must also be ex-
amined: procedure and policy.
Procedural Limitations of the Section 9-507 Remedies
The second basis of the Atlas Thrift decision focuses on the proce-
dural implications of the language of section 9-507, which states that
the debtor "has a right to recover from the secured party any loss
89. Id. at 142, 290 P. at 91-92. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 2910 (West 1974); see also L.
JONES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES ON PERSONAL PROPERTY § 711 (5th ed.
1980): To get a deficiency judgment the mortgagee must "foreclose his mortgage in equity,
or in a manner provided by statute. By selling in any other mode he waives all claim for a
deficiency." (Footnote omitted.)
90. 107 Cal. App. at 139, 290 P. at 91.
91. See supra text accompanying notes 75-78.
92. U.C.C. § 9-202 (1978).
93. Id. § 9-101 official comment. The California Senate Fact Finding Committee on
Judiciary recognized the impact of § 9-202 on California security law: "This section would
change rather drastically the law of California, since the existing law makes the location of
title all-important in both defining the various [security] devices and in determining substan-
tive rights [under them]." CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE, SENATE FACT FINDING COMMITTEE
ON JUDICIARY, SIXTH PROGRESS REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE, PART 1, THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 125 (1959-1961), reprinted in CAL. COM. CODE § 9202 (West 1964).
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caused by a failure to comply with the provisions of this Part."94 The
defendant, Horan, made what on first impression seems a self-defeating
argument, contending that section 9-507 merely limits a debtor's reme-
dies to an affirmative cause of action against a secured party who
breaches the notice and commercial reasonableness requirements,
rather than providing a complete defense to a deficiency action.95
The strategy behind Horan's argument is actually quite simple.
The damages remedy of section 9-507(1) would have provided him at
best with a setoff to the deficiency judgment Atlas was seeking. If the
court found, as Horan argued, that compliance with the notice and sale
requirements was a condition precedent to recovery of any deficiency
judgment by the secured party, however, Horan could escape all re-
maining liability of the debt.
To evaluate Horan's argument, the court interpreted the language
of section 9-507(1) concerning the debtor's "right to recover." Adopt-
ing the reasoning of a New York court,96 the Atlas [hrft court con-
cluded that "'[tihe words used [by the statute] plainly contemplate an
affirmative action to recover for a loss that has already been sustained
... ' "997 The New York court decided, and the Atlas Thrift court
agreed, that the wording of the section indicated that it was "unlikely"
that the UCC drafters intended the section to afford a debtor a defense
to a deficiency judgment action.98 The New York and California
courts then concluded that, because the statute provided, in their judg-
ments, only affirmative relief, the courts should develop an absolute
defense to the secured party's deficiency judgment suit.99
Reading section 9-507(1) narrowly to provide the debtor only af-
firmative relief strains the language of the statute. The section provides
the debtor with certain "rights" against the creditor. 100 How those
rights are to be enforced procedurally is not limited to an affirmative
action, as the Atlas Thrif? court believed. The UCC, establishing a pol-
icy of liberal administration of its remedies, states that "[a]ny right...
declared by this Act is enforceable by action," 10' with "action" defined
as a "judicial proceeding includ[ing] recoupment, counterclaim, set-off
94. U.C.C. § 9-507(1) (1978).
95. Atlas Thrift, 27 Cal. App. 3d at 1007, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
-96. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Atlas Shirt Co., 66 Misc. 2d 1089, 323
N.Y.S.2d 13 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1971).
97. Atlas hrift, 27 Cal. App. 3d at 1008-09, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 321 (quoting Leasco Data
Processing, 66 Misc. 2d at 1091, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 16).
98. Id. at 1009, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 321.
99. Id.
100. "[T]he debtor... has a right to recover from the secured party any loss causedby a
failure [of the secured party] to cormpl, with the provisions of this Part." U.C.C. § 9-507(1)
(1978) (emphasis added).
101. Id. § 1-106(2).
. . " 102 By granting the debtor a "right," the plain language of sec-
tion 9-507(1) envisions not only an affirmative action, but any of a
number of procedural means of enforcing the debtor's claim to any
damages he or she can prove. The Atlas Thrift court did not take into
account the crucial definitions article 1 provides for interpreting the
UCC1o3 and, therefore, misread the section.
If the reasoning of Atlas Thrft is followed to its logical conclusion,
the secured party, besides being barred by the judge-made no-defi-
ciency rule from recovering a personal judgment against the debtor,
would also be liable in damages to the debtor under section 9-507(l).104
This result is disproportionate to any wrong committed by the secured
party or suffered by the debtor. It is, as well, a result contrary to UCC
policy as explained in the next section of this Comment.
Policy and the No-Deficiency Rule
The final basis for theAtlas Thrift decision is grounded very gener-
ally in policy; the court concluded "that the better reasoning and the
ends of justice require the acceptance of' the no-deficiency rule.105 It
can be argued, however, that the greatest flaw in this rule appears when
it is viewed in light of UCC policy.
The UCC establishes a compensatory scheme for damage awards;
it mandates awards that will put the injured party "in as good a posi-
tion as if the other party had fully performed. .. "106 Further, "neither
consequential or special nor penal damages may be had except as spe-
cjfical yprovidedin this Act. .... ,,107 This limitation on the availability
102. Id. § 1-201(1).
103. One commentator offered this explanation of the relation of article I to the UCC:
"Article 1 . . .is not intended to be a separate division of commercial law. In fact, the
provisions of that Article established the basic framework of the entire Uniform Commercial
Code." Clontz, Guide to a Secured Creditor's Remedies on Debtors' Default, 7 U.C.C. L.J.
348, 348 (1975).
104. The Supreme Court of Utah, for example, denied the secured party a deficiency
judgment because the sale of the collateral was made without notice and in a commercially
unreasonable manner. The court also awarded the debtor damages pursuant to § 9-507(1)
(UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-9-507 (1953) (amended 1963)). Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Bums,
562 P.2d 233, 234 (Utah 1977). A California appellate court has also suggested that the
debtor, in addition to escaping personal liability, may be entitled to damages. J.T. Jenkins
Co. v. Kennedy, 45 Cal. App. 3d 474, 484, 119 Cal. Rptr. 578, 585 (1975).
105. Atlas Thrift, 27 Cal. App. 3d at 1008, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 321.
106. U.C.C. § 1-106(1) (1978).
107. Id. (emphasis added). Official comment 1 to this section adds that "compensatory
damages are limited to compensation. They do not include consequential or special dam-
ages, or penal damages; and the Act elsewhere makes it clear that damages must be mini-
mized" (citation omitted).
In some instances courts have awarded the debtor punitive damages, reasoning that a
resale that does not comply with the notice and commercial reasonableness provisions is a
conversion by the secured party of the debtor's property. Section 1-106(1) allows punitive
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of punitive damages is intended to better reflect the commercial reali-
ties of the marketplace. Parties are presumed to act in good faith,108
and compensation, not penalties, for injury satisfies UCC policy.10 9
In order to effectuate this compensatory policy, the judiciary must
recognize that on facts such as those encountered in Atlas Thrift there
are two injured parties. The debtor has injured the secured party by
breaching his or her obligation to pay the debt; the secured party has
potentially injured the debtor by not complying with the sale or notice
requirements.' 0 An appropriate remedy, then, must compensate both
without unduly penalizing either.
The appropriate remedy for breach of the secured party's section
9-504(3) duties must reflect the policy underlying those duties. The
commercial reasonableness and notice of sale requirements work to
protect the defaulting debtor by ensuring that a fair price is recovered
from the sale of his or her collateral."I  Given these limitations on the
secured party's behavior, is the debtor in need of more protection than
the damages provision provides? The answer to this question depends
in part on whether the debtor is a reasonably sophisticated commercial
borrower or a consumer.
damages where explicitly provided by the UCC or by other rule of law. By analogizing to
the tort of conversion, therefore, an award of punitive damages is approved where the
debtor shows that the creditor acted with fraud, malice, or oppression. See Beneficial Fin.
Co. v. Young, 612 P.2d 1357, 1359 (Okla. 1980); Davidson v. First Bank & Trust Co., 559
P.2d 1228, 1232 (Okla.), modFfed, 609 P.2d 1259 (1977).
108. See Hail v. Owen County State Bank, 175 Ind. App. 150, 162, 370 N.E.2d 918, 928
(1977). See generaloy 2 A. SQUILLANTE & J. FONSECA, THE LAW OF MODERN COMMERCIAL
PRACTICES 859 (1981) (because "[m]ost commercial transactions are performed in good
faith," a flexible remedy allowing the creditor to recover a deficiency judgment but making
him or her liable to the debtor for any damages caused by noncompliance with the UCC is
to be preferred).
109. The UCC limits the secured party's disposition of the collateral to what is "com-
mercially reasonable." § 9-504(3). If the sale does not meet this standard, a remedy is
needed. If the creditor compensates the debtor in damages for the harm caused by a sale
conducted without notice or in an unreasonable manner, a commercially reasonable sale has
been approximated. This is all that the UCC and justice require. See Fedders Corp. v.
Taylor, 473 F. Supp. 961 (D. Minn. 1979) (damages awarded debtor for harm caused by an
improper sale approximated a commercially reasonable disposition); Minetz, supra note 29,
at 363 ("[i]f the secured party has reimbursed the debtor for any losses incurred by the
improper sale, he has approximated the commercially reasonable sale"); see also S. KLEIN-
MAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF BusINEss LAW § 13-24 (1973).
110. One court stated: "To hold that noncompliance deprived creditors of their right to
a deficiency judgment would not only protect the debtor, but it would also penalize the
creditor. In light of the fact that the sale of the collateral is necessitated by the fault of the
debtor, ..." the court rejected the no-deficiency rule. Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Young, 612
P.2d 1357, 1359 (Okla. 1980).
Ill. White, supra note 18, at 817-18; see IA P. COOGAN, W. HOGAN & D. VAGTs, supra
note 26, § 8.06[2].
In adopting article 9, the California legislature1 2 made a signifi-
cant change in its scope by limiting its application to commercial se-
cured transactions. Consumer credit sales are governed by the Retail
Installment Sales Act, which affords significant protections to the con-
sumer.' 13 For example, the Sales Act bars the creditor from recovering
a deficiency judgment under any circumstances. 1 4
The California decision to treat consumers in separate legisla-
tion 15 finds support in article 9 itself, which provides that statutes cov-
ering the field of consumer finance prevail over the UCC where the two
bodies of law might conflict. 1 16 The limitation of the scope of Califor-
nia's version of article 9 to commercial transactions recognizes that the
consumer in installment sales and loan transactions requires different
treatment and protection than does the commercial debtor."17 Stricter
protections for the commercial debtor, one California appellate court
declared, have not been "deemed to be necessary where equally compe-
112. Article 9 was enacted into law in California in 1963.
113. "A transaction, although subject to this division, is also subject to the Retail Install-
ment Sales Act, Title 2 (commencing with section 1801) of Part 4, Division 3 of the Civil
Code... and in the case of conflict between the provisions of this division and [the Retail
Installment Sales Act], the provisions of [the Retail Installment Sales Act] control." CAL.
COM. CODE § 9203(4) (West 1964 & Supp. 1982).
114. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1812.5 provides: "If the proceeds of the sale [of debtor's collat-
eral] are not sufficient to cover [expenses of the sale, expenses of retaking, including reason-
able attorney's fees, and expenses of keeping, storing or repairing the collateral for resale,
and satisfaction of the balance due under the contract], the holder may not recover the
deficiency from the [debtor] or from anyone who has succeeded to the obligations of the
[debtor]."
115. The California Retail Installment Sales Act, or Unruh Act, is consumer protection
legislation covering sales of goods and furnishing of services on an installment basis. The
Act applies where the buyers who obtain the goods or services do so without the principal
purpose of resale. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1802.1-1802.5 (West 1973 & Supp. 1982).
In adopting article 9 of the UCC, the California legislature deleted most operative ref-
erences to consumer sales. For example, the UCC notice provision of § 9-504(3) requires
that reasonable notice of the resale be sent the debtor, but where the collateral is consumer
goods, no additional notice to other secured parties need be sent. That requirement was
deleted from the California version. In the case of a consumer installment sale, § 9-504(3)
will not apply at all, because CAL. COM. CODE § 9203(4) gives the Retail Installment Sales
Act precedence over the UCC. Thus, the required notice is described at §§ 1812.2 and
1812.3 of the Civil Code and is substantially different from that provided in the UCC.
California has also enacted separate legislation for automobile financing transactions,
the Automobile Sales Finance Act, CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 2931-2984.4.
116. U.C.C. § 9-203(4) (1978).
117. "Retail installment sales acts are designed to protect the buyer from the unequal
bargaining power which normally exists between retailer and consumer. On the other hand,
the policy of Part [Chapter] 5 is to provide simple, efficient remedies producing the maxi-
mum realization upon the collateral so that credit will not only be easier but cheaper to
procure. While not necessarily inconsistent, these policies have different goals for which the
legislature requires different sets of rules." Project, California Chattel Security and Article
Nine ofthe Unform Commercial Code, 8 UCLA L. REv. 806, 966 (1961), reprinted in CAL.
COM. CODE § 9507 (West 1964) (footnotes omitted).
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tent businessmen are dealing with each other in arm's length transac-
tions."I"1 It is precisely in this situation involving a commercial debtor
and creditor that the no-deficiency rule is entirely unnecessary, as these
parties do not require the protection justifiably accorded to unsophisti-
cated consumers.
Assuming that a sale without personal notice or a commercially
unreasonable sale of the collateral has occurred, the commercial debtor
must prove damages to recover under section 9-507."9 Several courts
and commentators have pointed to the difficulty of firnishing such
proof;120 in fact, the debtor often may not actually be damaged. For
example, suppose that upon default the debtor owes the secured party
$10,000. After repossessing the collateral, which has a fair market
value of $8,000, the secured party sells it, without notice to the debtor,
and receives $8,000 from the sale. Because the fair market value of the
collateral has been realized at the sale, the debtor has suffered no actual
118. James Talcott, Inc. v. Gee, 266 Cal. App. 2d 384, 387, 72 CaL Rptr. 168, 170-71
(1968) (debtor argued that his default on installment purchase of a printing press should be
governed by the Retail Installment Sales Act; the court rejected this theory because the press
was bought for business, not personal, use, so the transaction did not merit the special pro-
tection applicable to consumer buyers).
The UCC drafters also recognized the special needs of consumer debtors: "Consumer
installment sales and loans present special problems of a nature which makes special regula-
tion of them inappropriate in a general commercial codification. . . . While this Article
applies generally to security interests in consumer goods, it is not designed to supersede such
regulatory legislation." U.C.C. § 9-101 official comment (1978).
119. "[T]he debtor.., has a right to recover from the secured party any loss causedby a
failure to comply with. . . Part [5]." U.C.C. § 9-507(l) (1978) (emphasis added).
120. For example, once the collateral has been sold, the debtor will have a difficult time
proving its fair market value at the time of sale. The Arkansas Supreme Court recognized
this problem, which is particularly difficult to overcome when the collateral has been re-
moved from the locality before the debtor learns of the sale. The court concluded, therefore,
that "simple considerations of fair play cast the burden of proof upon (the secured party]
... [I]t was the [secured party's actions] that make it at least difficult, if not impossible,
for [the debtor] to prove the extent of his loss. . . ." Norton v. National Bank of Com-
merce, 240 Ark. 143, 149, 398 S.W.2d 538, 542 (1966). The court then adopted the presump-
tion that the collateral was worth the amount of the debt and gave the secured party the
burden of proving the amount that should have been obtained at a reasonable sale. Id.
Indiana has also adopted the presumption rule in order to overcome the debtor's proof
problem: "[I]n cases where the debtor was not notified of an impending sale, the creditor
should be in a much better position to prove the value of the collateral at the time of the
disposition." Hall v. Owen County State Bank, 175 Ind. App. 150, 162, 370 N.E.2d 918, 928
(1977); see Minetz, supra note 29, at 362. But see Note,Remediesfor Failure to Notify Debtor
of Disposition of Repossessed Collateral Under the UCC, 44 U. COLO. L. Rav. 221, 227
(1972).
When the collateral is consumer goods, the minimum recovery provision of § 9-507(1)
applies. This section, which does not require that the debtor actually be damaged in order to
recover, solves the proof problem for the consumer debtor. See IA P. COOGAN, W. HOGAN
& D. VAGTS, supra note 26, at § 8.01[1].
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loss and cannot recover damages under section 9-507(l).12 1 Of course,
if the debtor could show that he or she would have redeemed the collat-
eral, damages for loss of its use might be available. 122 Because dam-
ages need not be calculable with mathematical accuracy, 123 mere
difficulty in attaching a dollar value to such a loss would not be fatal to
the debtor's claim.
If, on the other hand, a resale price of $6,000 is realized in a non-
complying sale for the same collateral worth $8,000, the debtor can
produce evidence of this shortfall and recover under section 9-507(1).
In this case, the debtor receives compensation in the form of a $2,000
setoff against the deficiency judgment awarded to the secured party.
But where nothing has been lost, as in the first example, compensation
is unnecessary and the UCC, therefore, provides no remedy.
The result reached by following the no-deficiency rule directly
conflicts with the compensatory scheme of the UCC's remedy provi-
sions. InAtlas Thrift, for example, even after the debtor's account was
credited with the asserted market value of the equipment, $2,000 was
left owing to the secured party.124 The denial of a deficiency judgment
to Atlas resulted in a windfall to Horan in the form of an obligation
avoided. The secured party's loss on the transaction amounted to a
penalty for failure to give notice.
In their efforts to protect the defaulting debtor, the California
courts and those in other jurisdictions adopting the no-deficiency rule
have given little attention to the rights of the secured party. In a loan
transaction, the secured party assumes the risk that the borrower will
default; 125 the secured transaction is a strategy to reduce that risk.
However, the security, especially where it is goods as opposed to chattel
paper or securities, likely will decline in value during the lifetime of the
loan, whether from normal wear and tear, outright damage, or destruc-
tion. To compensate for the decreasing value of the security, the UCC
gives the secured party the further right to a deficiency judgment.126 As
one commentator noted, "the whole purpose of a secured transaction is
to insure that the creditor will not find himself without an enforceable
remedy if default in payment or performance of the underlying obliga-
121. See Weaver v. O'Meara Motor Co., 452 P.2d 87, 91-92 (Alaska 1969); Conti Cause-
way Ford v. Jarossy, 114 N.J. Super. 382, 385-86, 276 A.2d 402, 404-05 (1971). But see
Leasco Data Processing, 66 Misc. 2d at 1090-91, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 14.
122. See Minetz, supra note 29, at 362.
123. U.C.C. § 1-106(1) official comment 1 (1978).
124. Atlas Thrift, 27 Cal. App. 3d at 1006 n.5, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 319 n.5.
125. "Credit is based on confidence that men will meet their obligations." F. WHITNEY,
THE LAW OF MODERN COMMERCIAL PRACTICEs 810 (2d ed. 1965).
126. See generally Clontz, supra note 103, at 364-67 (economic analysis of why creditors
should be allowed to collect deficiency judgments).
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tion should occur." 127
Those courts that have considered the liability of the secured party
in light of the policy of the UCC to avoid the assessment of penal dam-
ages have concluded that an automatic denial of a deficiency judgment
"would amount to a rejection of that policy. '1 28 The Nebraska
Supreme Court, for example, found that "[n]o sound policy requires us
to inject a drastic punitive element [denial of a deficiency judgment]
into a commercial context."1 29 Using similar reasoning, the Supreme
Court of North Dakota concluded that the no-deficiency rule "might
often cause a harsh and punitive result disproportionate to the credi-
tor's misconduct .... We do not believe that the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, which was written in the spirit of commercial
reasonableness, would countenance such an onerous result without
statutory language expressly mandating it .... ,,13o For example, the
drafters of the Code did include one "expressly mandat[ed]" penalty in
the remedy provision of section 9-507: the minimum recovery where
the collateral is consumer goods. To inject another punitive remedy,
the no-deficiency rule, into a system where compensation is the rule is
127. Davenport, Default, Enforcement and Remedies Under Revised Article 9 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code, 7 VAL. U.L. REV. 265, 267 (1973).
128. Fedders Corp. v. Taylor, 473 F. Supp. 961, 978 (D. Minn. 1979).
129. Cornett v. White Motor Corp., 190 Neb. 496, 501, 209 N.W.2d 341, 344 (1973).
130. State Bank of Towner v. Hansen, 302 N.W.2d 760, 767 (N.D. 1981); see also Bar-
bour v. United States, 562 F.2d 19, 21 (10th Cir. 1977) (UCC prohibits "penal damages");
United States v. Whitehouse Plastics, 501 F.2d 692, 696 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. deniedsub nom.
Baker v. United States, 421 U.S. 912 (1975) (when the secured transaction is between com-
mercial business persons, no policy supports the punitive no-deficiency rule); First Alabama
Bank of Montgomery v. Parsons, 390 So. 2d 640, 643 (Ala. App. 1980) (the UCC provides
for damages, so the additional penalty on the creditor of a denial of a deficiency judgment is
unnecessary); Hall v. Owen County State Bank, 175 Ind. App. 150, 166, 370 N.E.2d 918, 927
(1977) (policy of UCC is to provide "full recompense" to injured parties, not to assess penal-
ties); Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Young, 612 P.2d 1357, 1359 (Okla. 1980) (forfeiture of the se-
cured party's right to a deficiency judgment would be punitive in nature and thus contrary to
UCC policy); Grant County Tractor Co. v. Nuss, 6 Wash. App. 866, 496 P.2d 966 (1972)
(damages are available under UCC § 9-507(1); a forfeiture of the right to a deficiency judg-
ment is an unnecessary remedy).
One commentator, Professor Anderson, has raised an interesting counterargument on
this point. Recognizing that denial of a deficiency is a punitive remedy, he argues that it "is
not to be condemned because of that fact. U.C.C. § 1-103 preserves the pre-existing non-
UCC law unless displaced. Such prior law recognizes the right to penalize fiduciaries, such
as trustees and agents, who breach their fiduciary duty. The imposition of the obligation to
act in good faith and in a manner which is commercially reasonable would appear to elevate
the creditor from the traditional arm's length position to that of a semi-fiduciary and to
justify a punitive denial of relief." 4 R. ANDERSON, THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 9-
504:30 (Cum. Supp. 1981). Professor Anderson, however, may be overstating the duty of
good faith. As defined by the UCC, good faith encompasses a standard of "honesty in fact
[ ..land] observance by the merchant of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing."
U.C.C. § 1-203 official comment (1978). This definition does not appear to raise the
merchant's obligations to fiduciary status.
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to legislate judicially against the UCC policy of providing compensa-
tion only. t31
The no-deficiency rule, in addition to inflicting direct harm on the
secured party and awarding an unjustified benefit to the debtor, works
another hardship on the commercial world. When the secured party is
denied the deficiency judgment, the loss he or she suffers is passed on to
other credit customers in the form of higher prices, where the secured
party is a merchant extending financing, or in the form of higher inter-
est charges in the case of commercial lenders. 32 Because the penalty is
not born by the creditor, it probably does not serve to deter creditor
noncompliance with section 9-504(3)133 as strongly as some courts and
commentators have suggested.134 The no-deficiency rule, therefore,
seems commercially unreasonable in its impact on the financial com-
munity, as well as in its effect on the principal parties to the secured
transaction.
Conclusion
The no-deficiency rule adopted in Atlas Thrift Company v. Horan
results in the effective repeal of the UCC's compensatory damage pol-
icy in the secured transaction default. 35 It is, moreover, a rule without
reason. The Atlas Thrift court thought it was filling a gap in the UCC
remedies system, but it actually imported a no longer valid precedent
into that statute and created a new, punitive remedy against the non-
complying secured party. 136 The rule does not supplement the UCC,
131. Both forms of relief, § 9-507(1) as the exclusive remedy and § 9-507(1) plus the
rebuttable presumption as to the value of the collateral, can be reached without going be-
yond the language of the UCC. The rebuttable presumption result follows from "reading
§ 9-507(1) with reference to § 1-106(1) which provides for a liberal interpretation of reme-
dies." IA P. COOGAN, W. HOGAN & D. VAGTS, s.pra note 26, 936 & n.71.15. To find the
no-deficiency rule, however, a court must go beyond the terms of UCC to the common law
of the state, which may be quite different in form and in policy from the article 9 secured
transaction.
132. See Clontz, supra note 103, at 364-67. Professor Clontz points out that, "[w]hile the
'elimination of deficiencies' is called by some 'spreading the loss,' the loss in question seems
to be spread over all consumers who pay their debts. Thus, it becomes a 'social question' as
opposed to a legal solution." Id. at 367.
133. The cost of losing a deficiency judgment arguably could make a lender or merchant
less competitive if he or she were forced to raise credit charges or prices in order to compen-
sate for the loss. This possibility seems somewhat attenuated, however.
134. See, e.g., Randolph v. Franklin Inv. Co., 398 A.2d 340 (D.C. Ct. App. 1979); Cam-
den Nat'l Bank v. St. Clair, 309 A.2d 329, 333 (Me. 1973). See generally Denial of Deficiency,
supra note 15, at 661-62 (arguing that the no-deficiency rule is the best deterrent to creditor
noncompliance with § 9-504(3)). But see 2 A. SQUILLANTE & J. FONSECA, supra note 108, at
858-59 (contending that the § 9-507(1) damages provisions are a sufficient deterrent to credi-
tor misbehavior).
135. See supra note 130.
136. See supra notes 122-25 & accompanying text.
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but replaces the secured party's unconditional right to a deficiency
judgment with a penalty that neither UCC policy nor commercial reali-
ties support.
The California courts should reconsider whether the commercial
debtor who defaults on a secured loan really needs the protection of the
no-deficiency rule when the secured party sells the collateral without
notice or in a commercially unreasonable manner. If the secured party
compensates the debtor for any actual harm suffered due to the non-
complying sale, the secured party has in effect approximated the com-
mercially reasonable sale that the UCC mandates.137 Inflicting
additional penalties on the secured party furthers no commercial policy
once this compensation is made.
Norma Garrett Formanek*
137. See supra note 109.
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